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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
VS.
CASE NO. 88-0007-CA
ALVIN DALE RICHENS,
AppelIant/Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A.,
section 78-2a-3(2)(f).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the trial court's acceptance of
Defendant's guilty plea and the trial court's denial of the
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea heard before the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson sitting in Summit County, Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err

in accepting defendant's original

December 5, 1986 guilty pleas by not following the guidelines
subsequently espoused by the Utah Supreme Court in STATE V. GIBBONS.
2.

Did the trial court err

by denying defendant's motion to

withdraw guilty plea.
3.

Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel

during the plea bargaining stage and plea stage of the proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged, in several informations with:
Summit County Case No- 1109:
Count I, Burglary

(2nd Degree Felony)

Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony)
Count III, Receiving Stolen Property (3rd Degree Felony)
Summit County Case No. 1110:
Count I, Burglary

(2nd Degree Felony)

Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony)
Count III, Receiving Stolen Property (3rd Degree Felony)
Summit County Case No.

1113:

Count I, Burglary (3rd Degree Felony)
Summit County Case No. 1114:
Count I, Burglary

(2nd Degree Felony)

Defendant was bound over to District Court on all the Counts in
the various Informations.
On December 5, 1986, before 3rd District Court Judge Judith M.
Billings (R. 136, pg. 1-8), sitting in Summit County, Utah,
Defendant, represented by attorney Martin V. Gravis, entered into a
Plea Bargain with the State, signed an "Affidavit of Defendant,"
(R. 11-16) and plead guilty to:
Summit County Case No. 1109:
Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony)
Summit County Case No. 1110:
Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony)
Summit County Case No. 1113:
Count I, Burglary (3rd Degree Felony)
Summit County Case No. 1114:
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Count I, Burglary (3rd Degree Felony), a lesser included
offense included in the informationPursuant to a December 12, 1986 Judgment and Commitment
(R. 18-19), Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate sentence of zero to five years on each of the Theft
charges and zero to five years on each of the Burglary charges, each
of the sentences to run concurrently, but consecutively to the
sentence Defendant was serving at the time for another charge
unrelated to the Summit County cases.
On or about July 28, 1987 and August 10, 1987 Defendant, pro se,
filed Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R. 28-31), as well as several
other motions, requesting that the Court allow him to withdraw his
December 5, 1986 guilty pleas.
Legal Counsel, Elliott Levine, was appointed to represent the
Defendant, transcripts were ordered, and a hearing was held on
October 13, 1987 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson sitting in
Summit County, Utah.

After hearing Defendant's arguments, however,

the Court denied the Defendant's Motions to Withdraw his Guilty
Pleas. (R. 105 and 120-121)
Defendant then filed this present appeal, pro se, appealing the
trial court's denial of his Motions to Withdraw Guilty Pleas.
In an effort to address some of the problems Defendant was
facing with the Board of Pardons as a result of his Summit County
Guilty Pleas and commitment, an Amended Commitment and Judgment was
signed and entered by the Honorable Homer F„ Wilkinson on September
16, 1988, which merely made it clear on the face of

the Commitment

and Judgment that the crimes to which the Defendant plead guilty to

-3-

were property crimes and not crimes against the person.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in accepting

defendant's original December 5, 1986 guilty pleas by not following
the guidelines subsequently espoused by the Utah Supreme Court in
STATE V. GIBBONS and the requirements of Criminal Procedure Rule
11(e).
2.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred, and abused

its discretion, by denying defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea
in light of the violations of the STATE V. GIBBONS guidelines and
Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e) requirements.
3.

Appellant contends that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel during the plea bargaining stage and plea stage of the
proceedings.
ARGUMENTS

POINT I
It is Appellant's contention that the trial Court erred
originally in accepting Defendant's guilty plea on December 5, 1986.
As the basis for this assertion Appellant relies on the Utah Supreme
Court case of STATE v. GIBBONS. 740 P2d 1309 (Utah, 1987). In the
GIBBONS case very specific guidelines were set down by our State
Supreme Court governing acceptance of guilty pleas.

The Supreme

Court stated, at page 1312: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring

that constitutional requirements

are

complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis for that duty
is found in Boykin

v.

Alabama,

395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
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1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274

(1969)...."

What Appellant argues in this appeal is that he did not
understand the elements of the crimes to which he entered his guilty
plea and, in fact, states that he plead guilty to crimes for which he
was not guilty.
Under the guidelines of the GIBBONS case Appellant's argument
should be well taken on appeal.

The transcript of the proceeding

during which Appellant enter his pleas of guilty (R. 136, pg. 1-8) is
void of any questioning by the trial court as to whether Appellant
understood the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading
guilty. Likewise, the record is void of any explanation to the
Appellant of the elements of the crimes to which he was entering a
guilty plea.

Further, the record is void of any determination by the

trial court as to whether there was a factual basis for the pleas.
These deficiencies at the plea stage clearly violate the
Appellants constitutional rights, as set forth in BQYKIN, as well as
deviating from the requirements of Rule 11(e).

Once again, our State

Supreme Court, in GIBBONS, stated at page 1313: "Because a guilty
plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge,
it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.... The

judge

(emphasis added) must determine 'that the conduct which the defendant
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or
information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has
pleaded guilty.'... There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating
in

the

record

at

the

time

the

understanding of the nature oi

plea

is

entered

the

defendant's

the charge against him."
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In this present case the Appellant signed an "Affidavit of
Defendant" (R. 11-16), the contents of which the trial court almost
exclusively relied upon in accepting Appellant's guilty plea. (R.
136, pg. 4, 1. 12 to pg. 5, 1. 2 2 ) .

Once again, under GIBBONS (at

page 1313), the fact that Appellant signed this affidavit, indicated
he had read its contents and understood its contents does not cure
the deficiencies of the trial court as set forth herein. Even for
argument's sake if Appellant admits the sufficiency of the affidavit,
the trial court still did not carry out its burden imposed by U.C.A.,
section 77-35-11. (GIBBONS at pg. 1314)
While it is apparent that the guidelines set down in the GIBBONS
case were violated, the case of STATE v. VASILACQPULQS, 84 Utah Adv.
Rep. 25 (6-3-88) would indicate that the 1987 GIBBONS case would not
be applied retroactively and that the cases of UJARNER v. MORRIS, 709
P2d 309 (Utah, 1985), BROOKS v. MORRIS, 709 P2d 310 (Utah, 1985), and
STATE v. MILLER, 718 P2d 403 (Utah, 1986) are applicable to
Pre-Gibbons situations.
Even under a Pre-Gibbons analysis of the facts presented in the
present appeal, the record as a whole does not establish that the
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of
its consequences, to wit: establishing a factual basis for the pleas
to the crimes as well as making sure that the Appellant understood
each and every element of each crime as required by Rule 11(e). See
also STATE v. BRECKENRIDGE, 688 P2d 440 (Utah, 1983) and STATE v.
CQPELAND. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Ut. Sup. Ct., 12-6-88).
POINT II
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by denying
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his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea-

Appellant filed a Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Plea, pursuant to U . C . A . , section 77-13-6, on July
28, 1987 (R. 28-31) alleging as his basis violations of the
BOVKIN/GIBBQNS guidelines.

The trial court was thoroughly informed

by the Appellant of the factual and legal basis for his motion via
his "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea" (R. 75-86). However, the trial court denied Appellant's motion.
As such, Appellant feels that he met his burden of showing good cause
and the trial court abused its discretion by denying the withdrawal
motion. In support of this second point on appeal. Appellant
incorporates herein by reference the factual and legal argument set
forth above under Point I.
POINT III
Appellant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of
legal counsel during both the plea bargaining stage and plea entry
stage of the proceedings.
Basically, Appellant asserts that, upon the advise of his trial
counsel, he was advised to plead guilty to crimes which he did not
commit and as such, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The record would bear out this contention due to the fact that
counsel should have known the requirements of BOYKIN and Rule 11(e)
and as such, should have made sure that there was a factual basis for
the Appellant's plea bargain and the subsequent plea.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing argument, Defendant/Appellant requests that
this Court:
1.

Find that the trial court's acceptance of Appellant's guilty
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pleas violated the requirements of Rule 11(e) and BOYKIN,

and/or tha

the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to
withdraw his guilty pleas, and/or; that the Appellant was denied
effective assistance of counsel.
2.

That this court find that reversible error was committed by

the trial court and that Defendant's guilty pleas be set aside and
the case remanded;
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

appropriate under the circumstances.
Dated this 6th day of April, 1989.

Attorney
ppellant
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77-35-11. Rule 11 — Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court, and
shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty and
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the
consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty,
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. Defendants
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise
the defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea until
the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed
upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if
so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall advise
the defendant personally that any recommendation
as to sentence is not binding on the court.

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time
prior to conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest may
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of court.
i960
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGTHE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they failed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this 5th day
of April, 1989, to:

R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF UTAH
236 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
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